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Abstract
This paper presents some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network
formation. For this purpose, a few major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model
the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are brie￿ y reviewed and
discussed. Some economic applications are also illustrated to give the ￿ avour of the type of
predictions such models are able to provide.
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apply.1 Introduction
Very often in social life individuals take decisions within groups (households, friendships,
￿rms, trade unions, local jurisdictions, etc.). Since von Neumann and Morgenstern￿ s (1944)
seminal work on game theory, the problem of the formation of coalitions has been a highly
debated topic among game theorists.1 However, during this seminal stage and for a long
period afterward, the study of coalition formation was almost entirely conducted within the
framework of games in characteristic form (cooperative games) which proved not entirely
suited in games with externalities, i.e. virtually all games with genuine interaction among
players. Only in recent years, a widespread literature on what is currently known as nonco-
operative coalition formation or endogenous coalition formation has come into the scene with
the explicit purpose to represent the process of formation of coalitions of agents and hence
modelling a number of relevant economic and social phenomena.2 Moreover, following this
theoretical and applied literature on coalitions, the recent paper by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) opened the door to a new stream of contributions using networks (graphs) to model
the formation of links among individuals.3
Throughout these brief notes, I survey non exhaustively some relevant contributions of
this wide literature, with the main aim to provide an overview of some modelling tools for
economic applications. For this purpose, some basic guidelines to the application of coalition
formation in economics are presented using as primitives the games in strategic form.4 As far
as economic applications are concerned, most of the examples presented here mainly focus,
for convenience, on a restricted number of I.O. topics, as cartel formation, horizontal merger
and R&D alliances.
1Von Neumann & Morgenstern￿ s (1944) stable set and Aumann and Maschler￿ s (1964) bargaining set,
among the others, were solution concepts primarily designed to solve simultaneously the formation of a
coalition structure and the allocation of the coalitional payo⁄ among the members of each coalition (see also
Greenberg (1994) and Bloch (1997)).
2Extensive surveys of the coalition formation literature are contained in Greenberg (1994), Bloch (1997,
2003), Yi (1997, 2003) and Ray and Vohra (1997).
3Myerson (1977) and Aumann And Myerson (1988) were among the ￿rst papers to use graphs to model
cooperation between individuals. Excellent surveys of the network literature are contained in Dutta and
Jackson (2003) and in Jackson (2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007).
4Some of the results presented here are also contained in Currarini and Marini (2006).
12 Coalitions
2.1 Cooperatives Games with Externalities
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), a wide number of papers have developed solu-
tion concepts speci￿c to games with coalitions of players. This literature, known as cooper-
ative games literature, made initially a predominant use of the characteristic function as a
way to represent the worth of a coalition of players.
De￿nition 1 A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU cooperative game) can be
de￿ned as a pair (N;v), where N = f1;2;::i;::Ng is the set of players and v : 2N ! R+ is a
mapping (characteristic function) assigning a value or worth to every feasible coalition S.5
The value v(S) can be interpreted as the maximal aggregate amount of utility members of
coalition S can achieve by coordinating their strategies. However, in strategic environments
players￿payo⁄s are de￿ned on the strategies of all players and the worth (or value) of a group
of players cannot be de￿ned independently of the groups (or coalitions) formed by external
players (NnS). Hence, to obtain v(S) from a strategic situation we need ￿rst to de￿ne an
underlying strategic form game.
De￿nition 2 A strategic form game is a triple G = fN;(Xi;ui)i2Ng, in which for each
i 2 N, Xi is the set of strategies with generic element xi, and ui : X1 ￿ ::: ￿ Xn ! R+ is
every player￿ s payo⁄ function.
Moreover, henceforth we restrict the action space of each coalition S ￿ N to XS ￿
Q
i2S Xi. Let, also, v(S) =
P
i2S ui(x), for x 2 XN ￿
Q
i2N Xi.6




5Here we mainly deal with games with transferable utility. In games without transferable utility, the
worth of a coalition associates with each coalition a players￿utility frontier (a vector of utilities).
6See Section 2.5 for an economic explanation of these restrictions.
2Therefore, v(N) = 6 and v(fig) =
￿
4 if xj = A
2 if xj = B for j 6= i.
The cooperative allocation (3; 3) can be considered stable only if every player is expected
to react with strategy B to a deviation of the other player from the cooperative strategy A.
The above example shows that in order to de￿ne the worth of a coalition of players, it is
required a speci￿c assumption on the behaviour of the remaining players.
2.1.1 ￿- and ￿-characteristic Functions
The concepts of and core, formally studied by Aumann (1967), are based on von Neumann
and Morgenstern￿ s (1944) early proposal of representing the worth of a coalition as the
minmax or maxmin aggregate payo⁄ that it can guarantee its members in the underlying
strategic form game. Accordingly, the characteristic function v(S) in games with externalities
can be obtained assuming that outside players act to minimize the payo⁄ of every deviating
coalition S ￿ N. In this minimax formulation, if members of S move second, the obtained
characteristic function,






denoted ￿-characteristic function, represents what members in S cannot be prevented
from getting. Alternatively, if members of S move ￿rst, we have






denoted ￿-characteristic function, which represents what members in S can guarantee
themselves, when they expect a retaliatory behaviour from the complement coalition NnS.7
When the underlying strategic form game G is zero-sum, (1) and (2) coincide. In non-zero
sum games they can di⁄er and, usually, v￿(S) < v￿(S) for all S ￿ N.
However, and characteristic functions express an irrational behaviour of coalitions of
players, acting as if they expected their rivals to minimize their payo⁄. Although appealing
because immune from any ad hoc assumption on the reaction of the outside players (indeed,
7Note that players outside S are treated as one coalition, so the implicit assumption here is that playersin
NnS stick together after S departure from the grand coalition N.
3their minimizing behavior is here not meant to represent the expectation of S but rather
as a mathematical way to determine the lower bound of S￿ s aggregate payo⁄), still this
approach has important drawbacks: deviating coalitions are too heavily penalized, while
outside players often end up bearing an extremely high cost in their attempt to hurt devia-
tors. Moreover,the little pro￿tability of coalitional objections usually yield very large set of
solutions (e.g.,large cores).
2.1.2 Nash Behaviour among Coalitions
Another way to de￿ne the characteristic function in games with externalities is to assume
that in the event of a deviation from N, a coalition S plays ￿ la Nash with the remaining
players.8
Although appealing, such a modelling strategy requires some speci￿c assumptions on the
coalition structure formed by remaining players NnS. once a coalition S has deviated from
N.
Following the Hart and Kurtz￿ s (1983) coalition formation game, two extreme predictions
can be assumed on the behaviour of remaining players. Under the so called ￿-assumption,9
when a coalition deviates from N, the remaining players split up in singletons; under the
￿-assumption, players in NnS stick together as a unique coalition.10








where x is a strategy pro￿le such that, for all S ￿ N, xS 2 XS and 8j 2 NnS, xj 2 Xj























8This way to de￿ne the worth of a coalition in as a noncooperative equilibrium payo⁄ of a game played
between coalitions was ￿rstly proposed by Ichiishi (1983).
9Hurt and Kurz￿ s (1983) ￿- game is indeed a strategic coalition formation game with ￿xed payo⁄division,
in which the strategies consist of the choice of a coalition. Despite the di⁄erent nature of the two games,
there is an analogy concerning the coalition structure induced by a deviation from the grand coalition.
10See Chander and Tulkens (1997) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) for applications of this approach.
4where,

















In both cases, for (3) and (4) to be well de￿ned, the Nash equilibrium of the strategic
form game played among coalitions must be unique. Usually, v￿(S) < v￿(S) < v￿(S) for all
S ￿ N.
2.1.3 Timing and the Characteristic Function
It is also conceivable to modify the ￿- or ￿-assumption (coalitions playing simultaneously
￿ la Nash in the event of a deviation from the grand coalition) reintroducing the temporal
structure typical of the ￿ and ￿-assumptions. 11
When a deviating coalition S moves ￿rst under the ￿-assumption, the members of S
choose a coordinated strategy as leaders, thus anticipating the reaction of the players in NnS,
who simultaneously choose their best response as singletons. The strategy pro￿le associated
to the deviation of a coalition S is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game in which S is
the leader and players in NnS are, individually, the followers. We can indicate this strategy
pro￿le as a e x(S) = (e xS;xj(e xS)) such that








and, for every j 2 NnS







Su¢ cient condition for the existence of a pro￿le e x(S) can be provided. Assume that
G(NnS;xS), the restriction of the game G to the set of players NnS given the ￿xed pro￿le
xS, possesses a unique Nash Equilibrium for every S ￿ N and xS 2 XS, where XS is assumed
compact.
Let also each player￿ s payo⁄ be continuous in each player￿ s strategy. Thus, by the
closedness of the Nash equilibrium correspondence (see, for instance, Fudemberg and Ti-
role (1991)), members of S maximize a continuous function over a compact set and, by
11See Currarini & Marini (2003) for details.
5Weiestrass Theorem, a maximum exists. As a consequence, for every S ￿ N, there exists a
Stackelberg equilibrium e x(S).








Obviously, v￿(S) ￿ v￿(S). In a similar way, the ￿-assumption can be modi￿ed by as-
suming that a deviating coalition S plays as follower against all remaining players in NnS
acting as singleton leaders. Obviously, the same can be done under the ￿-assumption.
2.1.4 The Core in Games with Externalities
We can test the various conversions of v(S) introduced above by examining the di⁄erent
predictions obtained using the core of (N;v).
We ￿rst de￿ne an imputation for (N;v) as a vector z 2 Rn
+ such that
P
i2N zi ￿ v(N)
(feasibility) and zi ￿ v(i) (individual rationality) for all i 2 N.




i2S zi ￿ v(S) for all S ￿ N.
Given that coalitional payo⁄s are obtained from an underlying strategic form game, the
core can also be de￿ned in terms of strategies, as follows.




Example 2 (Merger in a linear Cournot oligopoly). Consider three ￿rms N = f1;2;3g
with linear technology competing ￿ la Cournot in a linear demand market. Let the demand
parameters a and b and the marginal cost c, be selected in such a way that interior Nash
equilibria for all coalition structures exist. The set of all possible coalitions of the N players is
N = (f1;2;3g;f1g;f2g;f3g;f1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;f￿g): By de￿nition, v(f￿g) = 0. Note
that if all ￿rms merge, they obtain the monopoly payo⁄ v(f1;2;3g = A
4, where A = (a￿c)2=b,
independently of the assumptions made on the characteristic function. These assumptions
matters for the worth of intermediate coalitions. Under the ￿- and ￿-assumptions, if either
6one single ￿rm or two ￿rms leave the grand coalition N, remaining ￿rms can play a min-
imizing strategy in such a way that, for every S ￿ N, v￿(S) = v￿(S) = 0. In this case,
the core coincides with all individually rational Pareto e¢ cient payo⁄, i.e. all points weakly





















. Under the ￿-
assumption, we know that when, say ￿rms 1 and 2, jointly leave the merger, a simultaneous
duopoly game is played between the coalition f1;2g and ￿rm f3g. Hence, v￿(f1;2g) = A
9.
Similarly for all other couples of ￿rms deviating from N. When instead a single ￿rm i leaves
N, a triopoly game is played, with symmetric payo⁄s v￿(fig) = A
16 (these payo⁄s are obtained
from the general expression v(S) = A
(n￿s+2)2 expressing ￿rms￿pro￿ts in a n-￿rm oligopoly).
In this case, since intermediate coalitions made of two players do not give each ￿rm more
than their individually rational payo⁄, the core under the ￿-assumption coincides with the
core under the ￿- and￿-assumptions. We know from Salant et al. (1982) model of merger
in oligopoly, that v￿(S) >
P
i2S v￿(fig) only for kSk > 0;8 kNk. This means that in the
merger game the core under the ￿-assumption shrinks with respect to the core under the ￿-
and ￿-assumptions only for n > 5. Under the ￿-assumption, when a single ￿rm leaves N,
a simultaneous duopoly game is played between the ￿rm fig and the remaining ￿rms Nnfig
acting as a single coalition. As a result, v(fig) = A
9, which is greater than A
12, the maximum
payo⁄ at least one ￿rm will obtain in the grand coalition. Therefore, under the ￿-assumption,
the core is empty. Finally, note that since under the ￿-assumption every single ￿rm playing
as leader obtains v(fig) = A
12, in such a case the core is unique and contains only the equal
split imputation z = ( A
12; A
12; A
12) [see Figure 1 and 2].
2.2 Coalitional Equilibria in Strategic Form Games
2.2.1 Strong Nash Equilibrium
In the ￿ core approach￿described above, players can sign binding agreements.12 When this
assumption is relaxed, a Nash approach to coalitional deviations becomes more appropriate.
The concept of equilibrium proposed by Aumann (1959), denoted strong Nash equilibrium,
extends the Nash equilibrium to every coalitional deviation. Accordingly, a strong Nash
equilibrium is de￿ned as a strategy pro￿le that no group of players can pro￿tably object,
given that remaining players are expected not to change their strategies.
12More speci￿cally, a coalition can change its strategy only by deviating from the grand coalition and it
cannot change strategy while remaining in the grand coalition.
7De￿nition 5 A strategy pro￿le b x 2 XN for G is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if there










> uh (b x) for some h 2 S:
Obviously, all SNE of G are both Nash Equilibria and Pareto E¢ cient; in addition they
satisfy the Nash stability requirement for each possible coalition. As a result, SNE fails to
exist in many economic problems, and in particular, whenever Nash Equilibria fail to be
Pareto E¢ cient.
For the three players merger game of Example 2, the set of SNE is empty. This is because







yielding a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation, is
not a Nash Equilibrium.
2.2.2 Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium
To soften the existence problem of the SNE, a re￿nement was proposed by Bernheim, Peleg
and Whinston (1987) and named coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE). Di⁄erently from
the SNE, here a restriction is imposed on coalional deviations that have to be self-enforcing,
i.e., not further improvable by subcoalitions of players.
De￿nition 6 A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is de￿ned inductively with respect
to the number of players n in the game: (i) If n = 1, then x￿
1 2 X1 is a CPNE if and only
if u1(x￿
1) ￿ u1(x1) for any x1 2 X1; x1 6= x￿
1. (ii) Let n > 1. Assume that the coalition-proof
Nash equilibria have been de￿ned for games with fewer than n players. (a) For any game G
with n players, x￿ 2 XN is a self-enforcing strategy pro￿le if, for all S   N, x￿
S is a CPNE of
the reduced game Gx￿
￿S:(b) Pro￿le x￿ is a CPNE of G if it is a self-enforcing strategy pro￿le











> ui (x￿) for some i 2 N.
For the three players merger game of Example 2, the symmetric Nash strategy pro￿le at







is a CPNE, since coalitional deviations made by two or three players are not self-enforcing.
82.2.3 Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures
According to the original spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), "the purpose of
game theory is to determine everything can be said about coalitions between players, com-
pensation between partners in every coalition, mergers or ￿ght between coalitions" (p.240).
To introduce the topic of competition among coalitions, a framework di⁄erent from which
used by traditional cooperative games is required. The ￿rst required step is to extend the
game (N;v) to a game with a coalition structure ￿ = (S1;S2;::::;Sm); i.e., a partition of
players N such that for all Sh;Sj 2 ￿, Sh \ Sj = ? and
S
k=1;2;::m Sk = N. The second step
is to de￿ne the worth to every coalition belonging to a given coalition structure. Finally, a
relevant issue is which coalition structure can be considered stable.
In their seminal contribution, Aumann and DrŁze (1974) extend the solution concepts of
cooperative game theory to games with exogenous coalition structures. In every ￿ 2 ￿(N),
the set of all partitions of the N players, each coalition is allowed to distribute its members
only its own worth v(Sk), here assumed equal to the Shapley value de￿ned for every given
coalition structure ￿ 2 ￿.13 However, the above restriction has been criticized as inadequate
for all models in which "the raison d￿ etre for a coalition S to form is that its members try
to receive more than v(S) - the worth of S." (Greenberg, 1994, p.1313). A part from this
criticism, the most commonly used stability concept within this framework is the coalition
structure core.
De￿nition 7 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game. The coalition structure ￿ 2 ￿(N) is stable
if its core is nonempty, i.e., if there exists a feasible payo⁄ z 2 Z(￿) such that, for every
Sk 2 ￿ , zk ￿ v(Sk). The game (N;v) has a coalition structure core if there exists at least
one partition that is stable.
2.2.4 The Partition Function Approach
The presence of externalities among coalitions of players calls for a more encompassing
approach than that o⁄ered by a cooperative games in characteristic function form. For
this purpose, in a seminal paper Thrall and Lucas (1963) introduce the games in partition
13The Shapley value is de￿ned as ￿(N;v) =
P
S￿N q(s)￿i(s), where q(s) =
(s￿1)!(n￿s)!
n! ; and ￿i(s) =
v(S) ￿ v(Snfig) is the marginal contribution of player i to any coalition S in the game (N;v): Therefore,
the Shapley value of player i represents the weighted sum of his marginal contribution to all coalitions he
can join.
9function form.
De￿nition 8 A TU game in partition function form can be de￿ned as a triple (N;￿;w);
where ￿ = (S1;S2;::::;Sm) is a partition of players N and w(S;￿) : 2N￿ ￿ ! R is a mapping
that assigns to each coalition S embedded in a given partition ￿ 2 ￿(N) a real number (a
worth).




where this minimum is over all partitions ￿ which contain S as a distinct coalition. This
approach constitutes a generalization of the cooperative game (N;v) and the two games
coincides when the worth of a coalition is independent of the coalitions formed by the other
players. When coaltions.payo⁄s are not independent, some assumptions are still required to
model the behaviour of coalitions with respect to rival.coalitions. Since Ichiishi (1983), the
modern theory of coalition formation adopts the view that coalitions cooperate inside and
compete ￿ la Nash with the other coalitions.
2.2.5 The Valution Approach
Since the games in partition function are hard to handle and often pose technical di¢ culties,
many recent contributions have imposed a ￿xed allocation rule distributing the worth of
a coalition to all its members. Such a ￿xed sharing rule gives rise to a per-member payo⁄
(valuation) mapping coalition structures into vectors of individual payo⁄s.
De￿nition 9 A game in valuation form can be de￿ned as a triple (N;￿;vi), where ￿ =
(S1;S2;:::;Sm) is a partition of players N and vi(S) : 2N ￿ ￿ ! RjSj is a mapping that
assigns to each individual belonging to a coalition S embedded in a given partition ￿ a real
number (a valuation).
De￿nition 10 A coalition structure is core stable if there not exists a coalition S and a
coalition structure ￿0 such that for S 2 ￿0 and for all i 2 S, vi(S;￿0) > vi(S;￿):14
14Analogous concepts of ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿-core stability can be de￿ned for games in valuation form.
10In the merger game of Example 1, the set of all feasible partitions is
￿ = (f(1;2;3)g;(f1;2g;f3g);(f1;3g;f2g);(f1g;f2g;f3g))







i . It is not core-stable under the valuation v￿
i.
2.2.6 Noncooperative Games of Coalition Formation
Most recent approaches have looked at the process of coalition formation as a strategy in a
well de￿ned game of coalition formation (see Bloch, 1997, 2003 and Yi, 2003 for surveys).
Within this new stream of literature, usually indicated as noncooperative theory of coalition
formation (or endogenous coalition formation), the work by Hurt and Kurz (1985) represents
a seminal contribution. Most recent contributions along these lines include Bloch (1995,
1996), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999) and Yi (1997). In all these works, cooperation is modelled
as a two stage process: at the ￿rst stage players form coalitions, while at the second stage
formed coalitions interact in a well de...ned strategic setting. This process is formally
described by a coalition formation game, in which a given rule of coalition formation maps
players￿announcements of coalitions into a well de￿ned coalition structure, which in turns
determines the equilibrium strategies chosen by players at the second stage. A basic di⁄erence
among the various models lies on the timing assumed for the coalition formation game,
which can either be simultaneous (Hurt & Kurz (1982), Ray & Vohra (1994), Yi (1997)) or
sequential (Bloch (1994), Ray & Vohra (1995)).
2.2.7 Hurt & Kurz￿ s Games of Coalition Formation
Hurt and Kurz (1983) were among the ￿rst to study games of coalition formation with
a valuation in order to identify stable coalition structures.15 As valuation, Hurt & Kurz
adopt a general version of Owen value for TU games (Owen, 1977), i.e. a Shapley value
with prior coalition structures, that they call Coalitional Shapley value, assigning to every
coalition structure a payo⁄ vector ’i(￿) in RN, such that (by the e¢ ciency axiom)
P
i2N
’i(￿) = v(N). Given this valuation, the game of coalition formation is modelled as a game
in which each player i 2 N announces a coalition S 3 i to which he would like to belong;
for each pro￿le ￿ = (S1;S2;:::;Sn) of announcements, a partition ￿ (￿) of N is assumed to
15Another seminal contribution is Shenoy (1979).
11be induced on the system. The rule according to which ￿ (￿) originates from ￿ is obviously
a crucial issue for the prediction of which coalitions will emerge in equilibrium. Hurt and
Kurz￿ s game ￿ predicts that a coalition emerges if and only if all its members have declared
it (from which the name of ￿ unanimity rule￿ also used to describe this game).
Formally:




Si if Si = Sj for all j 2 Si
fig otherwise.
Their game ￿ predicts instead that a coalition emerges if and only if all its members
have declare the same coalition S (which may, in general, di⁄ers from S). Formally:
￿ (￿) = fS ￿ N : i;j 2 S if and only if Si = Sjg.
Note that the two rules of formation of coalitions are "exclusive" in the sense that each
player of a forming coalition has announced a list of its members. Moreover, in the gamma-
game this list has to be approved unanimously by all coalition members. Once introduced
these two games of coalition formation, a stable coalition structure for the game ￿ (￿ ) can
be de￿ned as a partition induced by a Strong Nash Equilibrium strategy pro￿le of these
games.
De￿nition 11 The partition ￿ is a ￿-stable (￿ -stable) coalition structure if ￿ = ￿(￿￿) for









￿) for at least one h 2 S:
It can be seen that the two rules generate di⁄erent partitions after a deviation by a
coalition: in the ￿-game, remaining players split up in singletons; in the ￿-game, they stick
together.





In the recent literature on endogenous coalition formation, the coalition formation game
by Hurt and Kurz is usually modelled as a ￿rst stage of a game in which, at the second stage
formed coalitions interact in some underlying strategic setting. The coalition formation
rules are used to derive a valuation vi mapping from the set of all players￿announcements ￿
into the set of real numbers. The payo⁄ functions vi are obtained by associating with each
partition ￿ = fS1;S2;:::;Smg a game in strategic form played by coalitions
G(￿) = (f1;2;:::;mg;(XS1;XS2;:::;XSm);(US1;US2;:::;USm));
in which XSk is the strategy set of coalition Sk and USk : ￿m
k=1XSk ! R+ is the payo⁄
function of coalition Sk, for all k = 1;2;:::;m. The game G(￿) describes the interaction
of coalitions after ￿ has formed as a result of players announcements in ￿.or ￿-coalition
formation games.
The Nash equilibrium of the game G(￿) (assumed unique) gives the payo⁄ of each coali-
tion in ￿; within coalitions, a ￿x distribution rule yields the payo⁄s of individual members.
Following our previous assumptions (see section 1.2) we can derived the game G(￿) from
the the strategic form game G by assuming that XSk =
Q
i2Sk




every coalition Sk 2 ￿. We can also assume ui =
USk
jSkj as the per capita payo⁄ function
of members of Sk. Therefore, using Example 1, for the ￿-game , ui(x￿(f1;2;3g) = A
12,
for i = 1;2;3; ui(x￿(fi;jg;fkg) = uj(x￿(fi;jg;fkg) = A
18, uk(x￿(fi;jg;fkg) = A
9 and
ui(x￿(fig;fjg;fkg) = A
16, for i = 1;2;3. Therefore, the grand coalition is the only stable
coalition structure of the ￿-game of coalition formation. For the ￿-game, there are no stable
coalition structures.
If we extend the merger game to n ￿rms, we know that the payo⁄of each ￿rm i 2 S ￿ N







s(n ￿ s + 2)2























s(n ￿ s + 2)2:
The condition above is usually veri￿ed for every s ￿ n. Therefore, the stability of the grand
coalition for the ￿-merger game holds also for a n-￿rm oligopoly.
2.2.8 Sequential Games of Coalition Formation
Bloch (1996,1997) introduces a sequential coalition-formation game with in￿nite horizon in
which, as in Hurt and Kurz￿ s (1988) ￿-game, a coalition forms if and only if all its members
have agreed to form the same coalition. The sequence of moves of the coalition formation
game is organized as follows. At the beginning, the ￿rst player (according to a given ordering)
makes a proposal for a coalition to form. Then, the player on his list with the smallest index
accepts or rejects his proposal. If he accepts, it is the turn of the following player on the list
to accept or reject. If all players on the list accept the ￿rst player￿ s proposal, the coalition
is formed and the remaining players continue the coalition formation game, starting with
the player with the smallest index who thus makes a proposal to remaining players. If any
of the players has rejected ￿rst player￿ s proposal, the player who ￿rst rejected the proposal
starts proposing another coalition. Once a coalition forms it cannot break apart or merge
with another player or a coalition of players. Bloch (1996) shows that this game yields the
same stationary subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure as a much simpler "size-
announcement game", in which the ￿rst player announces the size of his coalition and the
￿rst s1 players accept; then player is1+1 proposes a size s2 coalition and this is formed and
so on, until the last player is reached [see Figure 3 and 4]. This equivalence is basically due
to the ex ante symmetry of players. It can also shown that this size-announcement game
possesses a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure.
If we extend the merger game of Example 1 to n > 2 ￿rms, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium coalition structure of Bloch￿ s (1996) sequential game of coalition formation is
a coalition structure ￿ = (fSg;fjgj2NnS), with s = jSj equal to the ￿rst integer following
￿




=2.16 The explanation is as follows. We know that when a merger of
size s is formed in a Cournot market, the equal-split payo⁄ of each ￿rm i 2 S in the merger
16We know (Salant et al.,1983) that
￿





14is ui(x￿(fSg;fjgj2NnS)) = A=s(n ￿ s + 2)
2 which is greater than the usual Cournot pro￿t
ui(x￿(figi2N)) = A=s(n ￿ s + 1)
2 only for s >
￿




=2. When a merger of
size s is in place, each independent ￿rm outside the merger earns a higher pro￿t than that of
the members of the merger, equal to uj(x￿(fSg;fjgj2NnS)) = A=(n ￿ s + 2)
2. Therefore, in
the sequential game of coalition formation, the ￿rst ￿rms choose to remain independent and
free-ride on the merger formed by subsequent ￿rms. When the number of remaining ￿rms
is exactly equal to the minimal pro￿table merger size s =
￿





choose to merge, as it is no longer pro￿table to remain independent.
2.2.9 Equilibrium Binding Agreement
Ray and Vohra (1997) propose a di⁄erent stability concept. In this solution concept, players
start from some coalition structure and are only allowed to break coalitions to smaller ones.
The deviations can be unilateral or multilateral (i.e., several players can deviate together).
The deviators take into account future deviations, both by members of their own coalitions
and by members of other coalitions. Deviations to ￿ner partitions must be credible, i.e.
stable themselves, and therefore the nature of the de￿nition is recursive. We can start with
a partition ￿ and we can denote by B(￿) all coalition structures that are ￿ner than ￿.
A coalition ￿0 2 B(￿) can be induced from ￿ if ￿0 is formed by breaking a coalition in
￿. A coalition S is a perpetrator if it can induce ￿0 2 B(￿) from ￿. Obviously, S is a
subcoalition of a coalition in ￿. Denote the ￿nest coalition structure, such that jSj = 1 for
all S, by ￿0. There are no deviations allowed from ￿0 and therefore ￿0 is by de￿nition stable.
Recursively, suppose that for some ￿, all stable coalitions were de￿ned for all ￿0 2 B(￿), i.e.,
for all coalition structures ￿ner than ￿. Now, we can say that a strategy pro￿le associated
to a coalition structure x(￿) is sequentially blocked by x(￿0) for ￿0 2 B(￿) if i) there exists
a sequence fx(￿1);x(￿2);:::;x(￿m)g with x(￿1) = x(￿) and x(￿0) = x(￿m); ii) for every
j = 2;:::;m, there is a deviator Sj that induces ￿j from ￿j￿1; iii) x(￿0) is stable; iv) ￿j
is not stable for any x(￿j) and 1 < j < m; v) ui(x(￿0)) > ui(x(￿j￿1)) for all i 2 Sj and
j = 2;:::;m.
De￿nition 12 x(￿) is an equilibrium binding agreement if there is no x(￿0) for ￿0 2 B(￿)
that sequentially blocks x(￿) .
Applying the Equilibrium Binding Agreement to Example 1, we obtain that, apart from
x(￿0), with ￿0 = (f1g:f2g;f3g) which is by de￿nition stable, also the grand coalition
15strategy pro￿le x(￿) with ￿ = (f1:2;3g is an equilibrium binding agreement. For the n-￿rm
merger game, Ray and Vohra￿ s show that there is a cyclical pattern, in which, depending on
n, the grand coalition can or not be a stable coalition structure. For n = 3;4;5 it is stable,
but not for n = 6;7;8. For n = 9 is again stable and so on, with a rather unpredictable
pattern. "The grand coalition survives if there exist ￿ large zones of instability in intermediate
coalition structures." (Ray & Vohra, 1997, p.73).
2.3 Some Guidelines to Coalition Formation in Economic Appli-
cations
In order to compare and interpret the main predictions that endogenous coalition formation
theories obtain in some classical economic problems, it can be useful to use a very simple
setup in which the equal sharing rule within each coalition is not assumed but it is obtained
through some symmetry assumptions imposed on the strategic form game describing the
economic problem at hand. Once some basic assumptions are imposed on the strategic form
games underlying the games of coalition formation, the main economic applications can
be divided in a few categories: 1) games with positive or negative players-externalities; 2)
games with actions that are strategic complements or substitutes; 3) games with or without
coalition-synergies. According to these three features, we usually have a much clearer picture
of the predictions which can be expected from the di⁄erent concepts of coalitional stability
illustrated above and, in particular, of the stability of the grand coalition.
We start imposing some symmetry requirements on the strategic form game G.
Assumption 1. (Symmetric Players): Xi = X ￿ R for all i 2 N. Moreover, for all






Assumption 2.(Monotone Externalities): One of the following two cases must hold for
ui(x) : XN ! R assumed quasiconcave:
1. Positive externalities: ui(x) strictly increasing in xNni for all i and all x 2 XN;
2. Negative externalities: ui(x) strictly decreasing in xNni for all i and all x 2 XN.
16Assumption 1 requires that all players have the same strategy set, and that players payo⁄
functions are symmetric, by this meaning that any switch of strategies between players
induces a corresponding switch of payo⁄s. Assumption 2 requires that the cross e⁄ect on
payo⁄s of a change of strategy have the same sign for all players and for all strategy pro￿les.
Lemma 1 For all S ￿ N; e xS 2 argmaxxS2XS
P
i2S ui(xS;xNnS) implies e xi = e xj for all
i,j 2 S and for all xNnS 2 XNnS:
Proof 1 See Appendix. ￿
An important implication of Lemma 1 is that all players belonging to a given coalition
S ￿ N will play the same maximizing strategy and then will obtain the same payo⁄. We
can thus obtain a game in valuation form from a game in partition function form without
imposing a ￿xed allocation rule.
The next lemma expresses the fact that in every coalition structure ￿, at the Nash
equilibrium played by coalitions, when players-externalities are positive (negative), being
a member of bigger rather than a smaller coalition is convenient only when each member
of S plays a strategy that is lower (higher) than that played by each member of a smaller
coalition.
Lemma 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then for every S and T 2 ￿, with jTj ￿ jSj:
i) Under Positive Externalities, us(x(￿)) ￿ ut(x(￿)) if and only if xs ￿ xt;
ii) Under Negative Externalities, us(x(￿)) ￿ ut(x(￿)) if and only if xs ￿ xt.
Proof 2 See Appendix. ￿
Finally, we can use a well known classi￿cation of all economic models in two classes: 1)
games in which players￿actions are strategic complements; 2) games in which players￿actions
are strategic substitutes.17
De￿nition 13 The payo⁄ function ui exhibits increasing di⁄erences on XN if for all S,
xS 2 XS, x0
S 2 XS, xNnS 2 XNnS and x0
NnS 2 XNnS such that x0
S > xS and x0



























17See, for this de￿nition, Bulow et al (1985).
17This feature is typical of games, as price oligopoly models with di⁄erentiated goods, for
which players￿best-replies are upward-sloping. For these games, we can prove the following.
Lemma 3 Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let ui have increasing di⁄erences on XN, for all
i 2 N. Then for every S and T 2 ￿, with jTj ￿ jSj:
i) Positive Externalities imply xs ￿ xt ; ii) Negative Externalities imply xs ￿ xt.
Proof 3 See Appendix. ￿
Suppose now to have a game with actions that are strategic substitutes. This is the case
of Cournot oligopoly and many other economic models. Suppose also that a boundary on
the slope of the reaction mapping fS : RNnS ! RS is imposed by the following contraction
assumption.
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where k:k denotes the euclidean norm de￿ned on the space Rn￿s.
Lemma 4 Let assumptions 1-3 hold. Then for every S and T 2 ￿, with jTj ￿ jSj: i)
Positive Externalities imply xs ￿ xt ; ii) Negative Externalities imply xs ￿ xt.
Proof 4 See Currarini and Marini (2006).￿
Using all lemmata presented above we are now able to compare the valuation of players
belonging to di⁄erent coalitions in a given coalition structure and then, to a certain extent,
the pro￿tability of deviations. However, the above analysis is limited to games in which
forming a coalition does not enlarge the set of strategy available to its members and does
not modify the way payo⁄s within a coalition originate from the strategies chosen by players
in N. In fact, as assumed at the beginning of the paper, the action space of each coalition
S ￿ N is restricted to XS ￿
Q
i2S
Xi. Moreover v(S;￿) =
P
i2S
ui (x(￿)). The only advantage
for players to form coalitions is to coordinate their strategies in order to obtain a coalitional
e¢ cient outcome. This approach encompasses many well known games without synergies,
18such as Cournot and Bertrand merger or cartel formation and public good and environmental
games, but rules out an important driving force of coalition formation, i.e. the exploitation
of synergies, typically arising for instance in R&D alliances or mergers among ￿rms yielding
some sort of economies of scales.
Within this framework, we can present the following result.
Proposition 1 Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let ui possess increasing di⁄erences on XN,
for all i 2 N. Then the grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure in the game of
coalition formation ￿ derived from the game in strategic form G.
Proof. By Lemma 3, positive externalities imply that for all ￿, at x(￿) larger coalitions
choose larger strategies than smaller coalitions, while the opposite holds under negative ex-
ternalities, and then vi(S;￿) ￿ vi(T;￿) for all S;T 2 ￿ with jTj ￿ jSj. This directly implies
the stability of the grand coalition in ￿. To provide a sketch of this proof, we note that
any coalitional deviation from the strategy pro￿le ￿￿ yielding the grand coalition induces a
coalition structure in which all members outside the deviating coalitions appear as singleton.
Since these players are weakly better o⁄ than any of the deviating members, and since all
players were receiving the same payo⁄ at ￿￿, a strict improvement of the deviating coalition
would contradict the e¢ ciency of the outcome induced by the grand coalition. ￿
In games with increasing di⁄erences, players strategies are strategic complements, and
best replies are therefore positively sloped. The stability of the e¢ cient coalition structure
￿￿ = fNg in this class of games can be intuitively explained as follows. In games with
positive externalities, a deviation of a coalition S ￿ N will typically be associated with a
lower level of S￿ s members￿strategies with respect to the e¢ cient pro￿le x(￿￿), and with a
higher level in games with negative externalities (see lemma 3 and 4 above). If strategies are
the quantity of produced public good or prices (positive player-externalities), S will try to
free ride on non members by reducing its production or its price; if strategies are emissions
of pollutant or quantities (negative player-externalities), S will try to emit or produce more
and take advantage of non members￿lower emissions or quantities. The extent to which these
deviations will be pro￿table ultimately depend on the reaction of non members. In the case
of positive externalities, S will bene￿t from an increase of non members￿production levels or
prices; however, strategic complementarity implies that the decrease of S￿ s production levels
or prices will be followed by a decrease of the produced levels or prices of non members.
19Similarly, the increase of S￿ s pollutant emissions or quantities will induce higher pollution
or quantity levels by non members. Free riding is therefore little pro￿table in these games.
From the above discussion, it is clear that deviations can be pro...table only if best reply
functions are negatively sloped, that is, strategies must be substitutes in G. However, the
above discussion suggests that some ￿ degree￿ of substitutability may still be compatible with
stability. Indeed, if S￿ s decrease in the production of public good is followed by a moderate
increase in the produced level of non members, S may still not ￿nd it pro￿table to deviate
from the ec / cient pro￿le induced by . Therefore, if the absolute value of the slope of the
reaction maps is bounded above by 1, the stability result of proposition 1 extends to games
with strategic substitutes.
Proposition 2 Let assumptions 1-3 hold. The grand coalition N is a stable coalition struc-
ture in the game of coalition formation ￿ derived from the game in strategic form G.
Moreover, we can extend the results of proposition 1 and 2 to games with negative
coalition-externalities.18
De￿nition 14 A game in valuation form (N;￿;vi) exhibits positive (negative) coalition-
externalities if, for any coalition structure ￿ and a coalition S 2 ￿ , vi(S;￿0) > (<)vi(S;￿)
where ￿0 is obtained from ￿ by merging coalitions in ￿nS.
It is clear fromthe above de￿nition, that under negative coalition-externalities, v
￿
i (x(￿ (￿0))) <
v￿









￿￿ (￿0) = (fSg;fNnSg): The following propositions exploits this fact.
Proposition 3 Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let ui possess increasing di⁄erences on XN,
for all i 2 N. Let also the game (N;￿;vi) exhibits negative coalition-externalities. Then the
grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure in the game of coalition formation derived
from the game in strategic form G.
18See Bloch (1997) or Yi (2003) for such a de￿nition. There is not a clear relationship between games with
positive (or negative) player-externalities and games with positive (or negative) coalition-externalities. How-
ever, for most well known games without synergies, both positive-player externalities (PPE) plus strategic
complement actions (SC) as well as negative-player externalities (NPE) plus strategic substitute actions (SS)
yield games with positive coalition-externalities. These are the cases of merger or cartel games in quantity
oligopolies (NPE+SS), merger or cartel games in price oligopolies (PPE+SC) and public goods (PPE+SS)
or environmental games (NPE+SS). Similarly, we can obtain Negative Coalition-Externalities in a game by
associating NPE and SC as in a cartel game in which goods are complements and then the game exhibits
SC.
20Proposition 4 Let assumptions 1-3 hold. Let also the game (N;￿;vi) exhibits negative
coalition-externalities. Then the grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure in the game
of coalition formation derived from the game in strategic form G.
A comparison of the above results, obtained for Hurt and Kurz￿ s (1985) games of coalition
formation, with the other solution concepts can be mentioned. It can be shown (see Yi, 1997)
that for all games without synergies in which - as in the merger example - players prefer
to stay as singletons to free-ride on a forming coalition - Bloch￿ s (1996) sequential game of
coalition formation gives rise to equilibrium coalition structures formed by one coalition and
a fringe of coalition acting as singletons. Moreover, even in a linear oligopoly merger game,
Ray and Vohra￿ s (1997) Equilibrium Binding Agreement may or may not support the grand
coalition as a stable coalition structure, depending on the number of ￿rms in the market.
When the game G is a game with synergies, a classi￿cation of the possible results. becomes
even more complex. To give an illustration, we can introduce a simple form of synergy
by assuming, as in Bloch￿ s (1995) and Yi￿ s (1997) R&D alliance models, that when ￿rms
coordinate their action and create a R&D alliance, they pool their research assets in such
a way to reduce the cost of each ￿rm in proportion to the number of ￿rms cooperating in
the project.19 Let the producing cost of ￿rms participating to a R&D alliance of s ￿rms be
c(xi;si) = (c+1￿si)xi, where si is the cardinality of the alliance containing ￿rm i: Let also
a > c ￿ n. As shown by Yi (1997), at the unique Nash equilibrium associated with every





a ￿ (n + 1)(c + 1 ￿ si) +
k P
j=1
sj (c + 1 ￿ sj)
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(a ￿ (n ￿ si + 1)(c + 1 ￿ si) + (n ￿ si)c)
2
(n + 1)2 :
Straightforward manipulations show that the deviation of a coalition Si from the grand








(n2 ￿ 4(nc ￿ c2) ￿ 8(a ￿ c ￿ 1):
19This is usually classi￿ed as a game with negative coalition-externalities (see Yi, 1997, 2003).
21For example, for n = 8, a deviation by a group of six ￿rms (si = 6) induces a per ￿rm
payo⁄ of v
￿
i (￿ (￿0)) =
(a￿c+15)2
81 higher than the every ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ in the grand coalition
vi (￿ (￿￿)) =
(a￿c+7)2
81 . Therefore, it becomes more di¢ cult to predict the stable coalition
structures in Hurt and Kurz￿ s ￿ and ￿-games. In the sequential games of coalition formation
(Bloch, 1996 and Ray & Vohra 1999) for a linear Cournot oligopoly in which ￿rms can form
reducing-cost alliances, and each ￿rm￿ s i 2 S bears a marginal cost
ci = ￿ ￿ ￿s
where s is the size of the alliance to which ￿rm￿ s i belongs, the equilibrium pro￿t of each










Therefore, the formation of alliances induces negative externalities on outsiders, just
because an alliance reduces marginal costs of participants and make them more aggressive in
the market. Moreover, members of larger alliance have higher pro￿ts and then, if membership
is open, all ￿rms wants to belong to the association (Bloch, 1996, 2005). In the game of
sequential coalition formation, anticipating that remaining players will form an association
of size (n￿s), the ￿rst s players optimally decide to admit s￿ = (3n + 1)=4 and the unique














We follow here the standard notation applied to networks.20 A nondirected network (N;g)
describes a system of reciprocal relationships between individuals in a set N = f1;2;::;ng,
as friendships, information ￿ ows and many others. Individuals are nodes in the graph g and
links represent bilateral relationship between individuals.21 It is common to refer directly to
g as a network (omitting the set of players). The notation ij 2 g indicates that i and j are
linked in network g. Therefore, a network g is just a list of which pairs of individuals are
20See, for instance, Jakcson and Wolinski (1996), Jackson (2003) and van den Noweland (2005).
21Here both individuals engadged in a relationship have to give their consent for the link to form. If the
relationship is unilateral (as in advertising) the appropriate model is a directed network. Also, here the
intensity of a link is assumed constant.
22linked to each other. The set of all possible links between the players in N is denoted by
gN = fijji;j 2 N;i 6= jg. Thus G =
￿
g ￿ gN￿
is the set of all possible networks on N, and
gN is denoted as the complete network. To give an example, for N = f1;2;3g; g = f12;13g
is the network with links between individuals 1 and 2 and 1 and 3, but with no link between
player 2 and 3. The complete network is gN = f12;23;13g. The network obtained by adding
link ij to a network g is denoted by g + ij, while the network obtained by deleting a link ij
from a network g is denoted g ￿ ij. A path in g between individuals i and j is a sequence
of players i = i1;i2;::;iK = j with K ￿ 2 such that ikik+1 2 g for each k 2 f1;2;::;K ￿ 1g.
Individuals who are not connected by a path are in di⁄erent components C of g; those who
are connected by a path are in the same component. Therefore, the components of a network
are the distinct connected subgraphs of a network. The set of all component can be indicated
as C(g). Therefore, g =
S
g02C(g) g0. Let also indicate with N(g) the players who have at
least one link in network g.
3.2 Value Functions and Allocation Rules
It is possible to de￿ne a value function assigning to each network a worth.
De￿nition 15 A value function for a network is a function v : G ! R.
Let V be the set of all possible value functions. In some applications v(g) =
P
i ui(g),
where ui : G ! R. A network g 2 G is de￿ned (strongly) e¢ cient if v(g) ￿ v(g0) for all g0 2
G. If the value is transferable across players, this coincides with Pareto-e¢ ciency.22
Since the network is ￿nite, it always exists an e¢ cient network. Another relevant mod-
elling feature is the way in which the value of a network is distributed among the individuals
forming the network.
De￿nition 16 An allocation rule is a function Y : G ￿ V ! RN.
Thus, Yi(g;v) is the payo⁄obtained by every player i 2 N(g) under the value function v.
Some important properties of the value functions v and of the allocation rules Y are listed
below.23
22A network gis Pareto e¢ cient (PE) with respect to a value v and an allocation rule Y if there not exists
any g0 2 G such that Yi(g0;v) ￿ Yi(g;v) with strict inequality for some i Note that if a network is PE with
respect to v and Y for all possible allocation rules Y ; it is (strong) e¢ cient (see Jackson 2003).
23See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson (2005a) for details.
23(1) Component Additivity. A value function v is component additive if v(g) =
P
g02C(g) v(g0) for all g 2 G:
This property requires that the value of the network equals the sum of the value of its
components. This means that the value of one component is independent of the structure of
the other components. When an allocation rule Y distributes all the value accruing to one
component to its members, it is component balanced.24
(2) Component Balance. An allocation rule is component balanced if for any compo-






(3) Fairness (Equal Bargaining Power). An allocation rule Y satis￿es fairness if,
for any component additive v and for every g 2 G,
Yi(g) ￿ Yi(g ￿ ij) = Yj(g) ￿ Yj(g ￿ ij):
This property implies that under Y every i and j gain equally from the existence of
their link when compared to their payo⁄s in absence of this link. If we take a permutation
of the players p : N ! N, we can de￿ne the same network with permuted individuals as
gp = fijjp(h);j = p(k);hk 2 gg, and if vp (gp) = v(g), we say that the value function is
anonymous.
(4) Anonymity. An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any permutation p of the
N players, Yp(i)(gp;vp) = Yi(v;g):
A strong symmetry assumption on the allocation rule Y requires that for all anonymous
v 2 V , g 2 G and permutations p such that gp = g, Yp(i)(gp;vp) = Yi(v;g) (equal treatment
of equals).
When compared to the characteristic function of cooperative games (see Section 1.1),
here a value function v is sensitive not only to the number of players connected (in a compo-
nent of g) but also to the speci￿c architecture in which they are connected. However, v can
be restricted to depend only on the number of players connected in a coalition. In a seminal
contribution, Myerson (1977) starts with a TU cooperative game (N;v) and overlaps a com-
24An allocation rule is balanced if
P
i Yi(g;v) = v(g) for all v and g.
24munication network g to such a framework. Myerson (1977) associates a "graph-restricted
value" vg : 2N ! R, assigning to each coalition S a value equal to the sum of worth gen-
erated by the connected components of players in S. Formally, players in S have links
in g(S) = fij 2 gji 2 S; j 2 Sg and this induces a partition of S into subsets of players
S(g) that are connected in S by g. Thus, vg(S) =
P
g02CS(g) v(g0) for every S ￿ N, where
CS(g) indicates the set of components induced by g involving players belonging to coalition
S. This value assumes that players in S can coordinate their action only within their own
components.25 Two assumptions underline this value: i) there are no externalities between
di⁄erent components of a network; ii) what matters for the worth vg is only the worth of the
coalition of players which are in a component, not the type of connections existing within the
coalition. Within this framework, Myerson characterizes a speci￿c allocation rule (known as
Myerson value) distributing the payo⁄s among individuals, and shows that under two axioms
- fairness and component additivity - the unique allocation rule satisfying these properties
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g (S [ fig) ￿ v
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3.3 Networks Formation Games
3.3.1 3.3.1 Networks Formation in Extensive Form
Aumann and Myerson (1988) propose an extensive form game to model the endogenous
formation of cooperation structures. In their approach, which involves a sequential formation
of links among players, bilateral negotiations take place in some predetermined order. Firstly,
an exogenous rule determines the sequential order in which pairs of players negotiate to form
a link. A link is formed if and only if both players agree and, once formed, cannot be broken.
The game is one of perfect information and each player knows the entire history of links
accepted or rejected at any time of the game. Once all links between pairs of players have
formed, single players can still form links. Once all players have decided, the process stops
and the network g forms and the payo⁄ is assigned according to the Myerson value, i.e., the
Shapley value of the restricted game (N;vg). Stable cooperative structure are considered
only those associated with subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
25This implies a component balanced allocation rule Y .
25Example 3.26 Suppose a TU majority game with N = f1;2;3g and v(S) = 1 if jSj ￿ 2
and v(S) = 0 otherwise. If the exogenous rule speci￿es the following order of pairs: f1;2g;
f1;3g; f2;3g. The structure f1;2g is the only cooperation structure supported by a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game. Neither player 1 nor player 2 have an interest to form a
link with player 3, provided that the other player has not formed a link with 3. So, using
backward induction, if at the ￿nal stage f2;3g has formed, at stage 2 also f1;3g forms and
player 1 obtains a lower payo⁄ than in a coalition with only player 2. Thus, at stage 1 player
1 forms a link with player 2 and the latter accepts. No other links are formed at the following
stages.
It is possible that a subgame Nash equilibrium of the Aumann and Myerson￿ s network
formation game in extensive form does not support the formation of the complete network
even for superadditive games. Moreover, no general results are known for the existence of
stable complete networks even for symmetric convex games.27
3.3.2 Networks Formation in Strategic Form
Myerson (1991) suggests a noncooperative game of network formation in strategic form.28
For each player i 2 N a strategy ￿i 2 ￿i is given by the set of players with whom she want
to form a link, i.e., ￿i = (SjS ￿ Nnfig). Given a n-tuple of strategies ￿ 2 ￿1￿￿2￿::￿￿n
a link ij is formed if and only if j 2 ￿i and i 2 ￿j. Denoting the formed (undirected) network
g(￿), the payo⁄ of each player is given by Yi(v;g(￿)) for every ￿ 2 ￿N. A strategy pro￿le
is a Nash equilibrium of the Myerson￿ s linking game if and only if, for all player iand all




We can also de￿ne a network g Nash stable with respect to a value function v and an
allocation rule Y , if there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium ￿ such that g = g(￿).
The concept of Nash equilibrium applied to the network formation game appears a too
weak notion of equilibrium, due to the bilateral nature of links. The empty network (a g
26This example is taken from Dutta, van den Noweland & Tijs (1995).
27See, for a survey of this approach, van den Noweland (2005).
28This game is also analyzed by Quin (1993) and Dutta, van den Noweland & Tijs (1995).
26with no links) is always Nash stable for any v and Y . Moreover, all networks in which there
is a gain in forming additional links but no convenience to sever existing links are also Nash
stable. Re￿nements of the Nash equilibrium concept for the network formation process have
been proposed. The pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) plays a
prominent role in the recent developments of the analysis of networks formation.
3.3.3 Pairwise Stability
We should expect that in a stable network players do not bene￿t by altering the structure of
the network. Accordingly, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) de￿nes a notion of network stability
denoted pairwise stability.
De￿nition 16. A network g is pairwise stable with respect to the allocation rule Y and
value function v if
(i) for all ij 2 g, Yi(v;g) ￿ Yi(g ￿ ij;v) and Yj(v;g) ￿ Yj(g ￿ ij;v), and
(ii) for all ij 2 g, if Yi(g + ij;v) > Yi(g;v) then Yj(g + ij;v) < Yj(g;v).
As shown by Jackson and Watts (1998), a network is pairwise stable if and only if it
has no improving path emanating from it. An improving path is a sequence of networks
fg1;g;:::;gKg, where each network gk is defeated by a subsequent (adjacent) network gk+1,
i.e., Y i(gk+1;v) > Y i(gk;v) for gk+1 = gk ￿ ij or Yi(gk+1;v) ￿ Yi(gk;v) and Yj(gk+1;v) ￿
Yj(gk;v) for gk+1 = gk + ij, with at least one inequality holding strictly. Thus, if there not
exists any pairwise stable network, then it must exists at least one cycle, i.e. an improving
path fg1;g;:::;gKg with g1 = gK. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show that the existence of
pairwise stable networks is always ensured for certain allocation rules. They prove that under
the egalitarian and the component-wise egalitarian rules,29 pairwise stable networks always
exists. In particular, under the egalitarian rule, any e¢ cient network is pairwise stable.
Under the component-wise allocation rule, a pairwise stable network can always be found.
This can be done for component additive v by ￿nding components C that maximize the
payo⁄s of its players, and then continuing this process for the remaining players NnN(C).
The network formed by all these components is pairwise stable. Another allocation rule
29The egalitarian allocation rule Y e is such that Yi
e(g;v) =
v(n)
n for all i and g. The component-wise




when N(C), the set of players in component C is non empty and Yi
ce(g;v) = 0 otherwise. See Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson (2003) for details.
27with strong existence properties is the Myerson value. As shown by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), under Myerson￿ s allocation rule there always exists a pairwise network for every value
function v 2 V . Moreover, all improving paths emanating from any network lead to pairwise
stable networks, i.e. there are no cycles under the Myerson value allocation rule.30
However, as it is shown by Jackson and Wolinsky and by Jackson (2003), there exists a
tension between e¢ ciency and stability whenever the allocation rule Y is component balanced
and anonymous, in the sense that there does not exists an allocation rule with such properties
that for all v 2 V yields an e¢ cient network that is pairwise stable. In what follows we report
the illustrative example by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) known as the connection model.
Example 4. (The Connection Model-Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). This is
a model dealing with social communication between individuals. Links among individuals
allows them to communicate directly, but also indirectly with those individuals to whom their
adjacent individuals are linked, and so on. To form a link is costly, but yields also a bene￿t
depending on the distance tij among individuals, de￿ned as the number of links in the shortest
path between i and j ( tij = 1 when there is no path between i and j). De￿ning wij the
value of individual j to individual i, the utility of each player from network g is








where 0 < ￿ < 1 is a parameter expressing the value for i of the proximity of j: less
distant links are more valuable than more distant ones. Let also v(g) =
P
i2N ui(g). In
the symmetric case, with cij = c, wij = 1 for all j 6= i and wii = 0, we have the following
results:
i) For c < ￿￿￿
2 the unique e¢ cient and pairwise stable network is the complete network
gN; ii) For ￿ ￿￿
2 < c < ￿ +((n￿2)=2)￿
2, the star network with one individual maintaining
one link with all other individuals is the only e¢ cient network and this is pairwise stable
for ￿ ￿ ￿
2 < c < ￿; (iii) For c > ￿ any nonempty pairwise stable network is such that each
player has two links and is ine¢ cient;(iv) For c > ￿+((n￿2)=2)￿
2 the empty network is the
only e¢ cient network. Let us show these results for N = f1;2;3g [see also Figure 5] When
c < ￿ ￿ ￿
2, this implies that ￿
2 < ￿ ￿ c, and every pair of individuals not directly connected
would gain by forming a direct link (since c < ￿), and this also increases the network value.
30See Jackson (2003) for details.
28The value of the complete network is v(gN) = 6(￿ ￿ c). The value obtained with the star











> 0 for c < ￿ ￿ ￿
2. For gS to become e¢ cient it is required
that ￿￿￿
2 < c < ￿+￿
2, where the right hand side of the inequality ensures that every player
who is maintaining only one link receives a positive payo⁄. The star network gS becomes
the unique pairwise stable network when ￿ ￿￿
2 < c < ￿; since in this case neither peripheral
players want to create links nor the player maintaining all links (center of the star) want
to sever her links. 31 The critical cost range is ￿ + ￿2
2 > c > ￿, since in this case the
unique pairwise stable network is the empty network, but this is ine¢ cient given that the





> 0. Finally, for c > ￿ + ￿2
2 , the empty
network is the only e¢ cient pairwise stable network.
Thus, the example above shows that a pairwise stable network can either be ine¢ cient or
e¢ cient, depending on the cost range. The tension between e¢ ciency and stability appears
here for intermediate levels of the cost.
3.3.4 Further Re￿nements of Network Stability Concepts
As in the case of coalition formation, equilibrium concepts immune to coordinated deviations
by players are also conceivable for networks (see Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997, Dutta, Tijs and
van den Noweland, 1998 and Jackson and van den Noweland 2005). By allowing every subset
of players to coordinate their strategies in arbitrary ways yields a strong Nash equilibrium
for network formation games. That is, a strategy pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N is a strong Nash equilibrium
of the network formation game if there not exist a coalition S ￿ N and a strategy pro￿le
￿0




with strict inequality for at least one i 2 S. Hence, a network g is strongly stable
with respect to a value function v and an allocation rule Y , if there exists a strong Nash
equilibrium ￿ such that g = g(￿).
Similarly, an intermediate concept of stability, stronger than pairwise stability and weaker
than strong Nash equilibrium, has been proposed (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) and denoted
31For N > 3 the encompassing star is not necessarily the unique pairwise network.
29pairwise Nash equilibrium. This can be de￿ned as a strategy pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N such that, for





and there not exists a pair of agents (i;j) such that
Yi(v;g(￿) + ij) ￿ Yi(v;g(￿))
Yj(v;g(￿) + ij) ￿ Yj(v;g(￿))
with strict inequality for at least one of the agents. Therefore, a network g is pairwise
Nash stable with respect to a value function v and an allocation rule Y , if there exists a
pairwise Nash equilibrium such that g = g(￿).32
It can be shown that, given a value function v and an allocation rule Y , the set of
strongly stable networks is weakly included in the set of pairwise Nash stable networks and
that the latter set coincides with the intersection of pairwise stable networks and Nash stable
networks.33 Moreover, the set of pairwise stable networks and the set of Nash stable networks
can be completely disjoint even though neither is empty.34
In the next section, I brie￿ y illustrate some very simple applications of network formation
games to classical I. O. models. These are taken from Bloch (2002), Belle￿ amme and Bloch
(2004) as well as Goyal and Joshi (2003).
3.4 Some Economic Applications
3.4.1 Collusive Networks
In Bloch (2002) and in Belle￿ amme and Bloch (2004) it is assumed that ￿rms can sign
bilateral market sharing agreements. Initially ￿rms are present on di⁄erent (geographical)
markets. By signing bilateral agreement they commit not to enter each other￿ s market.
32This equilibrium concept has been adopted in applications by Goyal and Joshi (2003) and Belle￿ amme
and Bloch (2004) and formally studied by Calvo-Armengol and Ilkilic (2004), Ilkilic (2004) and Gillies and
Sarangi (2004).
33See, for instance, Jackson and. van den Nouweland, (2005) and Bloch and Jackson (2006).
34See Bloch and Jackson (2006) and Bloch and Jackson (2007), for an extensions of these equilibrium
concepts to the case in which transfers among players are allowed.
30If ij 2 g, ￿rm i withdraws from market j and ￿rm j withdraws from market i. For every
network g and given N ￿rms, let ni(g) denote the number of ￿rms in ￿rm i￿s market, with
ni(g) = n￿di(g) where di(g) is the degree of vertex (￿rm) i in the network, i.e. the number
of its links. If all ￿rms are identical, ￿rm i￿s total pro￿t is














If n ￿ 3; there are exactly two pairwise stable networks, the empty network and the
complete network. For n = 2, the complete network is the only stable network.
Note that the empty network is stable since for every symmetric ￿rm the bene￿t to form
a link is






that, for n ￿ 3, is negative.













and this holds only for ni(g) = nj(g) = 1, i.e., when the network is complete.
In this case (see, Figure 6 for the case with 3 ￿rms),
Ui(g
N) ￿ Ui(g







Therefore, it follows that the only nonempty network which is pairwise stable is the
complete network.
313.4.2 Bilateral Collaboration among Firms
Bloch (2002) and Goyal and Joshi (2003) consider the formation of bilateral alliances between
￿rms that reduce their marginal cost, as
ci = ￿ ￿ ￿di(g)
where di(g) denotes the degree of vertex i, i.e. the number of bilateral agreements signed
by ￿rm i.












For such a case, the only pairwise stable network turns out to be the complete network
gN (see Goyal and Joshi, 2003). This is because, by signing an agreement, each ￿rm increases
its quantity by ￿qi =
n￿
n + 1
, consequently, its pro￿t. Moreover, when a large ￿xed cost to
form a link is included in the model, Goyal and Joshi show that stable networks possess a
speci￿c form, with one complete component and a few singleton ￿rms.
4 Appendix
Lemma 1. For all S ￿ N; e xS 2 argmaxxS2XS
P
i2S ui(xS;xNnS) implies e xi = e xj for all
i,j 2 S and for all xNnS 2 XNnS:
Proof 1. Suppose e xi 6= e xj for some i;j 2 S: By symmetry we can derive from e xS a new
vector x0
























S + (1 ￿ ￿)e xS
￿
2 XS; we obtain a
contradiction. ￿
32Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then for every S and T 2 ￿, with jTj
￿ jSj: i) Under Positive Externalities, us(x(￿)) ￿ ut(x(￿)) if and only if xs ￿ xt; ii) Under
Negative Externalities, us(x(￿)) ￿ ut(x(￿)) if and only if xs ￿ xt.
Proof 2. We ￿rst prove the result for the case of positive externalities, starting with
the ￿ only if￿ part. By assumption 1, all members of T get the same payo⁄ at x(￿). By
de￿nition of x(￿), the pro￿le in which all members of T play xt maximizes the utility of
each member of T, so that
(8) ut((xt;xt)xs) ￿ ut((xs;xs);xs):
Suppose now that xs > xt. By assumption 1 and 2.1 we have
(9) ut((xs;xs);xs) = uti((xs;xs);xs) = us((xs;xs);xs) > us((xt;xt);xs):
To prove the ￿ if￿part, consider coalitions T1, T2 and S which, as de￿ned at the beginning
of this section, are such that jT1j = jSj and such that fT1;T2g forms a partition of T. By
de￿nition of x(￿), the utility of each member of S is maximized by the strategy pro￿le xS.
Using the de￿nition of us and of xs we write:
(10) us((xt;xt);xs) ￿ us((xt;xt);xt):
By assumption 2.1, if xs ￿ xt then
(11) us((xt;xt);xt) ￿ us((xs;xt);xt):
Finally, by assumption 1 and the fact that jT1j = jSj, we obtain
(12) us((xs;xt);xt) = ut1((xt;xt);xs) = ut((xt;xt);xs);
implying, together with (11) and (12), that
(13) us(x(￿)) = us((xt;xt);xs) ￿ ut((xt;xt);xs) = ut(x(￿)):
Consider now the case of negative externalities (assumption 2.2). Condition (8) holds
independently of the sign of the externality. Suppose therefore that xs < xt. By negative
externalities and symmetry we have
(14) ut((xs;xs);xs) = us((xs;xs);xs) > us((xt;xt);xs):
33The ￿ if￿part is proved considering again coalitions T1, T2 and S. Again, Condition (10)
holds independently of the sign of the externality. By negative externalities, if xs ￿ xt then
(15) us((xt;xt);xt) ￿ us((xs;xt);xt):
As before, we use assumption 1 and the fact that jT1j = jSj to obtain
(16) us((xs;xt);xt) = ut((xt;xt);xs);
and, therefore, that
(17) us(x(￿)) = us(xt;xs) ￿ ut(xt;xs) = ut(x(￿)):
￿
Lemma 3. Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let ui have increasing di⁄erences on XN, for
all i 2 N. Then for every S and T 2 ￿, with jTj ￿ jSj: i) Positive Externalities imply
xs ￿ xt ; ii) Negative Externalities imply xs ￿ xt.
Proof 3. i) Suppose that, contrary to our statement, positive externalities hold and
xs > xt. By increasing di⁄erences of ui for all i 2 N (and using the fact that the sum of
functions with increasing di⁄erence has itself increasing di⁄erences), we obtain:
(18) us((xs;xt);xs) ￿ us((xs;xt);xt) ￿ us((xt;xt);xs) ￿ us((xt;xt);xt):
By de￿nition of xs we also have:
(19) us((xt;xt);xs) ￿ us((xt;xt);xt) ￿ 0:
Conditions (18) and (19) directly imply:
(20) us((xs;xt);xs) ￿ us((xs;xt);xt) ￿ 0:
Referring again to the partition of T into the disjoint coalitions T1 and T2, an application
of the symmetry assumption 1 yields:
us((xs;xt);xs) = ut1((xs;xt);xs); (21)
us((xs;xt);xt) = ut1((xt;xt);xs):
Conditions (20) and (21) imply:
(22) ut1((xs;xt);xs) ￿ ut1((xt;xt);xs):
34Positive externalities and the assumption that xs > xt imply:
(23) ut2((xs;xt);xs) > ut2((xt;xt);xs):
Summing up conditions (22) and (23), and using the de￿nition of T1 and T2, we obtain:
(24) ut((xs;xt);xs) > ut((xt;xt);xs);
which contradicts the assumption that xt maximizes the utility of T given xs.
The case ii) of negative externalities is proved along similar lines. Suppose that xs < xt.
Conditions (20) and (21), which are independent of the sign of the externalities, hold, so
that (22) follows. Negative externalities also imply that if xs < xt then (23) follows. We
therefore again obtain condition (24) and a contradiction.
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